

AD-A263 884



2

STUDY

PROJECT

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.

**THE DILEMMA OF INITIAL ENTRY  
TRAINING: THE FORGOTTEN ELEMENT  
OF A CHANGING ARMY**

BY

**LIEUTENANT COLONEL THOMAS G. MILLER**  
**United States Army**

**DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A:**  
**Approved for public release.**  
**Distribution is unlimited.**

**DTIC**  
**ELECTE**  
**MAY 11 1993**  
**S E D**

**USAWC CLASS OF 1993**



**U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013-5050**

AS 5 07 070

**93-10119**



REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved  
OMB No. 0704-0188

1a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION <b>UNCLASSIFIED</b>		1b. RESTRICTIVE MARKINGS	
2a. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY		3. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY OF REPORT	
2b. DECLASSIFICATION / DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE			
4. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)		5. MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)	
6a. NAME OF PERFORMING ORGANIZATION <b>U.S. Army War College</b>	6b. OFFICE SYMBOL (if applicable)	7a. NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION	
6c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code) <b>ROOT HALL, Bld 122 CARLISLE PA 17013-5050</b>		7b. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)	
8a. NAME OF FUNDING / SPONSORING ORGANIZATION	8b. OFFICE SYMBOL (if applicable)	9. PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER	
8c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)		10. SOURCE OF FUNDING NUMBERS	
		PROGRAM ELEMENT NO.	PROJECT NO.
		TASK NO.	WORK UNIT ACCESSION NO.
11. TITLE (Include Security Classification) <b>THE DILEMMA OF INITIAL ENTRY TRAINING: THE FORGOTTEN ELEMENT IN A CHANGING ARMY</b>			
12. PERSONAL AUTHOR(S) <b>THOMAS G. MILLER, LTC, IN, USARMY</b>			
13a. TYPE OF REPORT <b>STUDY PROJECT</b>	13b. TIME COVERED FROM _____ TO _____	14. DATE OF REPORT (Year, Month, Day) <b>17 MARCH 1993</b>	15. PAGE COUNT <b>28</b>
16. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATION			
17. COSATI CODES		18. SUBJECT TERMS (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)	
FIELD	GROUP	SUB-GROUP	
19. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)  <b>- See Reverse Side -</b>			
20. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY OF ABSTRACT <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> UNCLASSIFIED/UNLIMITED <input type="checkbox"/> SAME AS RPT. <input type="checkbox"/> DTIC USERS		21. ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	
22a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL <b>Col William A. Saunders</b>		22b. TELEPHONE (Include Area Code) <b>717 245 4030</b>	22c. OFFICE SYMBOL <b>AWCA</b>

## **ABSTRACT**

**AUTHOR:** Thomas G. Miller, LTC, USA  
**TITLE:** The Dilemma of Initial Entry Training: The Forgotten Element in a Changing Army  
**Format:** Individual Study Project  
**Date:** 15 April 1993 **PAGES:** 25 **CLASSIFICATION:** Unclassified

Although there have been major fundamental changes in response to new doctrine, increasingly sophisticated weapon systems, a changing world security environment, and the training doctrine of tactical units, there has not been a complementary evolution in the training base and Initial Entry Training(IET). IET, its resources, environment and priority remains as it was in the early 1970's; buried beneath the priority of units organized under a Table of Organization and Equipment(TOE) and viewed as not important to the system. This study examines the evolution of the basis of the dilemma, the discrimination of those assigned to the training base, analyzes the current TRADOC IET strategy, and proposes a new architecture for IET.

**USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER**

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.

**THE DILEMMA OF INITIAL ENTRY TRAINING:  
THE FORGOTTEN ELEMENT OF A CHANGING ARMY**

**AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT**

by

**Lieutenant Colonel Thomas G. Miller  
United States Army**

**COL William A. Saunders  
Project Advisor**

**DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public  
release; distribution is unlimited.**

**UNITED STATES ARMY WAR COLLEGE  
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013**

Accession For	
NTIS	CRA&I <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
DTIC	TAB <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Unannounced	<input type="checkbox"/>
Justification .....	
By .....	
Distribution / .....	
Availability Codes	
Dist	Avail and/or Special
A-1	

## INTRODUCTION

The US Army's readiness to carry out its wartime missions is measured in terms of manpower, material, and training. Training is especially critical because it is the process by which the Army unites organized manpower and material resources within a doctrinal framework to attain levels of performance that can dictate the difference between success and failure in battle. Shortly after the establishment of the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) in July 1973, General Depuy set out to revamp the Army's training system. Starting with him and continuing with his successors, the system was refined, amended, and changed in response to the Army's changing needs. The configuration of the Army's training system of 1992 differs radically from the one that had existed when TRADOC was formed. There is one exception, the Army's approach and strategy for Initial Entry Training (IET).

Although there have been major fundamental changes in response to new doctrine, increasingly sophisticated weapon systems, a changing world security environment, and the training doctrine of tactical units, there has not been a complementary evolution in the training base and IET. IET, its resources, environment, and priority remains as it was in the early 1970's; buried beneath the priority of units organized under the Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE) and viewed as not important to the system. This paper will examine the evolution of the basis of

the dilemma, analyze the current TRADOC IET strategy, and propose a new architecture for IET.

## **BACKGROUND**

During the time period of 1973 to 1977 General Depuy and MG Gorman instituted a number of initiatives to "jump start" the current Army Training Program(ATP) that was terminally ill from the effects of the Vietnam War. Everything from the individual replacement system to the detailed review of training doctrine was scrutinized by no less than five blue ribbon panels. From this came the Skill Qualification Test(SQT), the Army Training and Evaluation Program(ARTEP), and the need for the National Training Center(NTC). This entire process never once seriously addressed the corresponding issues of the training base and what the changes in training doctrine would have on IET. As the Army was looking ahead into the 1980's in all other areas of training and training development, it was holding onto a 1960's version of IET. Basic training was not considered important enough to warrant the attention the rest of the training equation was receiving. The Army by default was saying that IET was not a factor in having a ready combat force and the process that transformed civilian to soldier was never considered. Simply put, IET was not considered a serious factor in the evolution and management of a changing Army during the 1970's.<sup>1</sup>

In 1978, General Starry took command of TRADOC and the shunning of IET and the resultant negative environment produced began to surface and attract the attention of a number of senior officers. As a result, General Starry established a Task Force, the "Committee of Nine", chaired by Major General Hixon and the nine training center commanders. One of the tasks was to examine the widespread inconsistencies in resourcing, policy, and procedures of the IET system. In all, the committee addressed fifty-seven issues critical to the improvement of the IET program and environment and recommended an immediate two tiered approach to correct the dilemma. First, raise the resourcing priority of the training base units and schools equal to that of the TOE units. Of particular resourcing importance was the need for additional weapons and equipment and an increase in the cadre of training companies and battalions. Second, change the personnel policies to ensure personnel assigned to training units receive equal and fair consideration in the promotion and selection process. Despite the recommendations of the Task Force nothing of substance was implemented to correct the situation and it appears the Army's senior leadership intentionally left the issue hanging. Exactly why they did this cannot be determined, but it is assumed they simply did not feel it important enough an issue at the time. <sup>2</sup>

In late 1981, the issue again surfaced and General Starry established another steering group, popularly known as the "Gang of Four" to reexamine the findings of the previous committee. The

panel consisting of the commanders of Ft. Knox, Ft. Jackson, Ft. Benning, and Ft. Dix also had the charter to serve as a forum with similar interests to identify major issues relating to initial entry training. This group presented its findings and recommendations to the TRADOC Commander, now Gen Otis. Among a number of other issues, the panel's report zeroed in on the lack of comparative resourcing in the training centers and the widely held perception among officers that duty in the training base was not important and that only second class officers with no career potential were assigned to training commands. The "Gang of Four" recommended that TRADOC and the Army promote the career value of training base assignments and place greater emphasis on the rewards and challenges. However, this was not a marketable issue. In order for change to occur, the Army needed to mandate measures to correct the discrimination. Unwilling to take such measures, the issue slowly eased back into the closets and the Army's senior leadership turned its head on the problem and the people it was devouring.<sup>3</sup>

In the 1980's the training evolution had one major focus: the Combat Training Centers (NTC, JRTC, CMTC). Airland battle and maneuver warfare totally absorbed the Army's training effort and resources and anything not considered relevant to warfighting took a second seat. It is not surprising that the Army, with its past approach to IET, viewed IET as one of the not relevant categories. To further aggravate this situation, in 1986 General Vuono became the TRADOC commander and immediately began his



architecture of the future Army through the publishing of FM 25-100, which was the training doctrine manual for the Army. Nowhere in the manual is IET or any other aspect of the training base mentioned as to its relation to the readiness and training process of the Army. Almost at the same time, TRADOC PAM 350-4, Army Training 1997, was published and included some key policy changes on the importance and need for a new IET strategy in the Army. An attempt to put together a meaningful strategy was completed in early 1988 and communicated throughout the training centers for implementation. The new strategy focused on small group instruction, an increase in the use of simulations and technology, and the decentralization of training responsibility to the company commander. The popularity and emphasis on FM 25-100 completely smothered the strategy and only those serving in the training base read and attempted to comply with it. Unfortunately those in the training base needed it the least and the Army's senior leadership through benign neglect let the gap widen between the training base and the rest of the Army.<sup>4</sup>

In 1988, General Thurman assumed command of TRADOC and shortly thereafter the IET dilemma surfaced again through the Training Center Commanders as a result of inadequate resources and the poor performance of training base officers on selection boards. General Thurman did little to correct the situation other than to ensure that training battalions received an equitable distribution of officers from the centralized command list. This did have an impact on the training base simply because these

quality officers felt it their duty to train soldiers to the best of their abilities, regardless of the resourcing and personnel problems. It is unfortunate they did not have a system to back them up and provide the opportunities they so rightly deserved. It essentially ended their hopes of further command due to the discrimination of selection boards.<sup>5</sup>

In 1988 General Foss assumed command of TRADOC with the primary focus on refining FM 25-100 and publishing FM 25-101, Battle Focused Training. Additionally, a large portion of TRADOC's effort and energy was focused on the Combined Arms Training Strategy (CATS), which primarily oriented on force modernization and training devices under the expected future resourcing constraints. The connection between the training base and unit training effectiveness was essentially ignored. Since then Panama, Desert Storm, and the draw-down have dwarfed the IET issue and again it sits and waits another day to resurface.<sup>6</sup>

## **TRADOC's INITIAL ENTRY TRAINING STRATEGY OF 1988**

In 1988 TRADOC began to implement its new IET strategy. The substance was to capitalize on the influence the Drill Sergeant had upon his soldiers and hinged on the ideal that Drill Sergeants training small groups of soldiers would be the key to a new level of effective training. TRADOC intended this new doctrine to guide IET training for the next ten years. It was

believed that the concepts of this new strategy would be applicable to TOE units as well as BCT(basic combat training), OSUT(one station unit training), and AIT(advanced individual training). It was boasted that commanders in the field should watch closely the initiatives ongoing in the training base--for they will not only guide the training of the quality soldiers who sustain their units, but the concepts emerging may well be the principles that lead to better training throughout the Total Army.<sup>7</sup>

The strategy included near, intermediate, and far-term visions of the way training could best be accomplished by concentrating on leader preparation and training execution. The strategy was based on the following principles:

- Training company commanders responsible for all training their soldiers receive.
- Teaching at platoon or smaller group level(one Drill Sergeant per 10 buddy teams).
- Training to standard.
- Training leverage through simulations and training technology.
- Instruction geared to capabilities of the students.
- Training for mastery and retention.
- Comprehensive evaluations.<sup>8</sup>

The near term vision was to inculcate into the system that the training company commander was the sole person responsible for training. Additionally, it allowed a system for excellent

soldiers to train in tasks beyond the charter of the Program of Instruction, provided additional leader training for those assigned to the training base, and lastly, promoted training in a more realistic combat environment aligned with Airland Battle. As a result IET would have a direct link to Airland Battle doctrine and the two would complement one another institutionally and in practice in the field.<sup>9</sup>

The intermediate term vision keyed on leader preparation and training execution. A more detailed and expansive explanation of IET strategy would be incorporated into training manuals to institutionalize the concept. Here the strategy envisioned training for retention through repeated practice on tasks under mentor type supervision throughout the training cycle rather than peaking for an end-of-cycle test. This concept supposedly would eliminate intense last minute reinforcement training by Drill Sergeants.<sup>10</sup>

The far term vision, 10 years out, envisioned the training company commander in charge of and responsible for all training his soldiers received. Retention of skills would be accomplished by repetitive, hands-on training in small groups with the Drill Sergeant as a caring mentor; the first line leader who would bond to his platoon. The envisioned end state was that the Army would benefit on two tiers: first, new soldiers would join a unit technically capable, fit, disciplined and ready to perform their MOS skills, and secondly, the IET experienced cadre rejoins the force better able to lead and train the Army of the future.<sup>11</sup>

## **AN ANALYSIS OF THE STRATEGY**

TRADOC's IET strategy is in reality a hollow strategy that addressed the entire issue at the wrong level and did not contain viable ways and means to achieve the desired end state. As an analogy, it was tactical not strategic in vision and substance. It is simply a plan of "how to conduct" training instead of "how to think" about training and had virtually no input outside of TRADOC. Many of the execution concepts are sound training ideas, but the strategy as a whole failed to achieve resourcing and consensus support from the Army. Although implemented at Ft. Jackson, the IET strategy is not adhered to at other Army Training Centers and is virtually unknown outside of TRADOC. Additionally, the Army has not updated the strategy despite dramatic changes the Army has undergone and will continue to undergo in the next five years. TRADOC itself acknowledges that the strategy is essentially stalled<sup>12</sup>.

First of all, as stated in the strategy, the idea that IET is in any way connected in doctrine and practice to Airland Operations never materialized. Nowhere in any of our airland manuals is IET connected to warfighting doctrine nor is there any attempt at implementation via the engine of change- doctrinal manuals. The strategy was only visible to those serving in the training base who had no ability to cause institutional change in

the Army as a whole. As a result, the training base was further isolated from the rest of the Army.

TRADOC regulation 350-6, IET Policies and Administration, was written in isolation from the capstone manuals of FM's 100-5, 25-100, and 25-101. Training units practice and implement FM's 25-100/101 only because its battalion commanders bring the experience and framework from their years in TOE units. As a result, training commanders somewhat "gerry-rig" the process in an attempt to force some connectivity between FM 25-100 and training units. This happens not by a TRADOC designed strategy, but through the initiative of concerned and competent training battalion commanders. FM 25-100/101 gives superficial lip-service to TDA units and makes no attempt at all to connect IET to TOE units. The only mention of TDA at all is in Chapter 2, Mission Essential Task List (METL) development, and there only a one page cursory glance on how TDA units should develop its METL.<sup>13</sup> Furthermore, the exclusion of the IET to TOE unit connectivity in FM 25-100 offers no doctrinal exposure of IET to leaders in the field and as a result the vast majority of commanders in TOE units have no idea what skills and subjects soldiers are taught in the training base. Nowhere in the schooling system are they taught what takes place in IET and most pay no attention to it because the system does not tell them what it is and that it is important.<sup>14</sup>

Secondly, the TRADOC strategy called for a great deal of emphasis on leader training for those serving in IET units and

those inbound for assignment. The problem with this concept is that it was confined to IET units within TRADOC and does not involve the total Army. One of the major issues at large is that the Army's leadership does not understand the IET environment. As a result of a lack of knowledge, the system transforms the unknown into something unimportant. This is more of a leadership issue outside of the training base than within it.<sup>15</sup>

TRADOC's vision of leaders in charge and totally responsible for training is certainly not a new concept or training strategy. The leadership dilemma is one of span of control, in that a training company of two officers, twelve Drill Sergeants, and six other support cadre is not manned to properly carry out its charter. The training company would have to nearly double the size of its cadre in order to conduct training by the process and to the standard envisioned by the strategy.<sup>16</sup>

Thirdly, the strategy did not address the bias of officers serving or who have served in a training unit. Most officers openly avoid training base assignments and their mentors actively encourage and help with this avoidance. This has become so overt that quality officers as a whole can avoid training base assignments and those who do get assigned will face a full scale battle of career survival and generally face a short career or a career that is not maximized. The obvious institutional outcome is that our senior leadership is made up of officers groomed in TOE only assignments and will end up sitting on promotion and

selection boards and subsequently discriminate against those with training base assignments.

Lastly, the dramatic resource shortfalls across the board in the training base were known up front and subsequently only cosmetically addressed at TRADOC.<sup>17</sup> Resourcing became the problem of the various training center commanders and their ability to cross level internal to the installation or training center. The strategy did not adequately address or research the means to make it work as designed. The most significant flaw of the strategy is the idea that a training company commander and his Twelve Drill sergeants are capable of training a 200 person company in small group type instruction. Of the twelve Drill Sergeants assigned, the average present for duty is eight due to duty, schools, and leave. That leaves eight Drill Sergeants to conduct "small group" instruction for 200 soldiers; that's a 25 to 1 ratio, hardly an effective way to train soldiers. The training company commander was given a mission impossible. Some training centers attempted to abide by this concept while others continued with business as usual operating under the training center commander's personalized program because the strategy did not adequately address and gain support for the means to execute the strategy.<sup>18</sup>

Currently there are two distinct armies, TOE and TDA. Each are resourced differently with TDA units operating under much more austere conditions. This further aggravates the less-than attitude the Army has of the training base and does not allow IET to provide the same environment that the soldier will encounter



when he gets to his TOE unit. The resourcing of the training base units should have been raised to at least parallel, if not equal, that of TOE units. The strategy addressed a host of new concepts all requiring an increase in resourcing, especially the small group instructor concept, yet the manning issues appear to have progressed no further than the strategy document. Similarity in manning of TDA and TOE is essential for the proper training and preparation of a soldier in the IET environment.

Additionally, equipment is pathetically short in IET. The Army has a vast fleet of vehicles, yet training base units do not have a single tactical vehicle. In Infantry OSUT, as an example, soldiers have to share gas masks, cleaning equipment, and sometimes TA-50. When conducting training on the M-60 machine gun, the M-29 squad automatic weapon, and the M-203 grenade launcher there are usually four to as many as 12 soldiers per weapon. The standard to qualify per the POI is virtually impossible to achieve and reinforcement training is highly ineffective with that ratio of students to weapons. If standards of the POI are to be met, the equipment must be made available to do so.<sup>19</sup>

## **A NEW CONCEPT FOR AN IET STRATEGY**

The dramatically changing Threat has direct implications for the training base and its mission. The increased reliance on rapidly deployable forces will require soldiers to think on their

own and higher discipline for adherence to standards in the absence of supervision. Moreover, these requirements drive the need for training focused on critical battlefield tasks.

Therefore, the mission of IET must be twofold, first, to prepare soldiers in the training base to be fully capable of performing as a thinking member of a squad, section, or crew in their initial assignment and, second, the professional training and development of the assigned cadre.

The intent of the proposed strategy is to simply provide a framework for Training Center Commanders to operate within. The ways and means of the framework architecture is based on a four tiered approach:

- Leadership and Organization

- Solderization

- Skill Retention

- Connectivity

The tiers form the framework for the conduct and desired environment of IET. This architecture is more like a commanders intent in that it prescribes what is expected versus how it is to be done. The tiers are tangible, yet flexible, and focus on the philosophy of IET and not on simple training execution dynamics as does the current strategy. Detailed training execution would be the business of the Training Center Commanders utilizing the

framework of current Army training doctrine and the requirements and guidance from the various branches.

TRADOC and senior leaders in the field would scrutinize the various inputs to the new strategy such as FM 100-5, TRADOC REG 350-6, the POI, field feedback, after action reviews, and most importantly resource shortfalls. This Total Army process would surface any disconnects between expectations, doctrine, and the processes in the training centers. Too many times TOE commanders periodically complain that the training base is sending unqualified soldiers to the field. The real problem is that those commanders do not understand what it is they are getting because they do not know what tasks and degree of proficiency an IET graduate is trained to. Again, Total Army involvement would be the heart of this new approach to IET.

## **LEADERSHIP AND ORGANIZATION**

Despite the highly systemized training arena, the art of personal leadership remains the cornerstone of readiness. The emphasis of leadership is to coach, teach and mentor with evaluation being a smaller by-product of the process. IET is a leadership lab where the overwhelming portion of leaders efforts are invested in leading and caring for soldiers. Company commanders and Drill Sergeants personally set the example through active participation in all aspects of training. They control the

environment and ensure soldiers are trained to standard. The soldier is positively influenced by the cadre insistence on high standards of performance, cadre competence, and positive leadership. They make the first and lasting impression on soldiers and are what the soldier uses as his measure from that point on in his military service. Soldiers deserve the best role models the Army can provide and these role models have to live up to the standards with no exceptions.

One of the most demanding challenges of leadership within the training base is in training the trainers. When a Drill Sergeant arrives he is hardly capable of assuming the trainer role of teaching all POI subjects to his soldiers. When he arrives he is an instructor but not necessarily a trainer. To become a trainer it is a combination of experience and a train the trainer program. For this program to be effective the new Drill Sergeant must be exposed to the situations and problems he will face and various techniques successfully used to correct those problems. He must know the lesson plan, be able to diagnose a soldier's problem and then develop a training plan to correct that problem. The Drill Sergeant must master the craft of the skills themselves then connect those base skills and standards to all future training. The additional challenge for the company commander, as well as the Drill Sergeant, is in the details of how to translate that to company training meetings and other means to get the outcomes he wants.

The main issue in the training of officers is to expose them early on to the IET environment. This would occur through the various service schools, operational assignments, and a local IET primer before entering the training base. Particularly important is the inclusion of IET as a major block of instruction in service school's curriculum. When Lieutenants and Captains leave their basic and advance courses they would have an understanding of IET and know what to expect from soldiers and leaders that arrive from the training base. After an IET assignment these officers would remain competitive and upon returning to TOE units would serve to cure the lack of knowledge problem that exists in units about IET. This rotation process would be the single greatest value to a Total Army approach to IET.

In the area of organization, the training company should at least resemble the structure of a TOE company by having Drill Sergeants as squad leaders and platoon sergeants and the addition of some Lieutenants as platoon leaders to provide the structure the soldier will see in his unit. This seems to ask a lot of the system, however, the contribution to the readiness of the force is immeasurable. This would also provide more flexibility to the training company commander to organize training and would cure the soldier to Drill Sergeant ratio problem currently plaguing the training base units.

Doctrinally it would allow the company commander and his cadre to implement FM 25-101 within the same framework as TOE units. A company commander and his cadre could then organize for

and conduct training as a company duplicating for the cadre, as well as the soldiers, the same environment and conditions as TOE units. This would be of great professional value to the cadre and meet the Army's ideal of a better trained cadre that rejoins the force after IET duty.

## **SOLDERIZATION**

The very essence of IET is solderization, the socialization process that transforms civilian to soldier and lays the groundwork for the building of cohesive units. Its hallmark is the standard that soldiers are taught and expected to think, look, and act as soldiers always. It does not occur by accomplishing a series of tasks or related hours in the POI. Rather, it results from the total immersion in a positive environment established by an active, involved leadership. This environment sets high standards, provides positive role models, and uses every training opportunity to reinforce basic soldier skills. It is interwoven into the basic fiber of all phases of IET. It begins in the Reception Battalion, continues through BCT, OSUT, and AIT, and is validated when soldiers join their first unit of assignment.

The Drill Sergeant's task is a complicated one. In order to make soldiers disciplined fighting men who put the welfare of their unit above personal concerns they must reform the trainees

cultural values. Today this includes the me first ethic, the right to do whatever one pleases, and the feeling of immunity from punishment. As a result, attitude building and development are the means to solderization. Training must be designed to bring about initial development and constant reinforcement of concepts that are important to the Army. These concepts are integral parts of Army tradition and include ethical standards, good order and discipline, individual soldier initiative, and especially teamwork. To foster bonding and increase levels of performance, teamwork and team building must be stressed. This sets the stage for integration of IET graduates into their first units.

Solderization, as with all other elements of this strategy, is based on Total Army involvement. With scientific, demographic, and field input the solderization process becomes a more bonafide system that allows the training base to produce a known quantity to both the Army and society as a whole. The training units would have a common mark on the wall to measure success by and more efficiently transition a civilian to soldier to unit. Additionally, all training centers would know the profile of the least common denominator soldier. As a result continuity is achieved between the various training centers with no difference between the combat, combat support, and combat service support solderization process.

## **SKILL RETENTION**

Currently, the training base for the most part misses the mark on skill retention because the current strategy is in reality focused on event oriented training and the sole measure of success is based on test gates. Training is focused on passing tests and not to the task and standard. Therefore retention is not the goal, passing the test is. Retention being critical, training should focus on continuous reinforcement of critical skills, link these skills with other related tasks, and then add realism in a tactical field training setting based on the MOS and its applicable environment. Integrated, connected training that is focused on the standards of critical skill level tasks using the building block approach is the answer.

Skill retention of a thinking, confident soldier is accomplished through smart application of the stages of training for both the soldier and the cadre. Initial training, that of learning tasks, is about soldiers practicing each step sequentially until the task is done correctly. Refresher training, training to standard, is about practicing to standards with more realism and the learning of skill transfer which link to other tasks. Sustainment training, training with realism, is about practicing collectively to maintain peak proficiency under simulated combat conditions to develop effective team relationships. Through out this process the cadre control the



environment, coach, teach and mentor, participate, and provide the connectivity of the tasks, soldier, and their units mission.

As an example, in infantry IET, instead of focusing only on achieving a score on basic rifle marksmanship, the approach would seek reinforcement through other follow-on training events. This would be by consistently focusing on taking well aimed shots and applying the fundamentals of rifle marksmanship during advanced rifle marksmanship, while wearing MILES (Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System) during individual tactical training, and linking this task with other combat skills during squad tactical training and finally during the seven day field training exercise. By focusing on the final goal, at the conclusion of IET you would have a competent and skillful marksman based on the total process and not on a score on BRM in week three of training.

## CONNECTIVITY

Connectivity has been mentioned in every area discussed so far in this paper. It is the most important element of the strategy because it that shapes IET and the soldiers it produces. It is the critical link between society and soldier, between soldier and his training unit, between the training base and TOE units, and is what constrains the process to meet expectations.

The connectivity of IET to soldier to TOE unit is what the Army as a whole should determine, not just TRADOC.

The connectivity philosophy would provide the training roadmap of IET by inclusion in FM 25-100/101 and the linkage between this doctrine and leadership, skill retention, and soldierization. Within IET, the training units link the critical tasks by a systemic approach to training to standard. Initial, refresher, and sustainment training sequence tasks to the soldier in a logical flow that allows the soldier not only to retain the skill, but understand where that task fits into the overall plan of his training. The soldier and cadre must clearly understand that every event and task in the POI is connected with other events and tasks.

This also lets the cadre of training units better identify shortcomings and disconnects between stated tasks, standards, and desired outcomes. This assessment based approach will allow the training base to better communicate with the field the profile of a newly trained soldier and adjust as necessary to the input from the field.

The connectivity will allow the cadre of training units to maintain their currency with what's going on outside the training base. Constant liaison with units receiving soldiers by the training centers will maintain not only the quality of soldiers but also the quality of the cadre through the interface with the TOE unit leaders. There will be no false expectations from

commanders of TOE units receiving soldiers because they will have been a major player in determining the profile of the soldier.

## CONCLUSION

The relative unimportance of IET and the subjugation of training units did not occur by design, but rather through benign neglect of the Army's leadership and institutions. It can be fixed as long as the underlying reasons of why and how it occurred are understood. First, it is not viewed as an important issue because it is not as glamorous as the warfighting ethos of the TOE Army. Second, none of the Army's senior leadership served or grew up in the training base, therefore, they resource, train and select in their own image. Third, Army leaders have been aware of the apparent bias against officers who command in the training base but say little because the problem runs counter to the philosophy of the Officer Personnel Management System that "all jobs are important" and that "all commands are equal". Fourth, it has been a TRADOC only process and did not involve the Total Army. Lastly, it suffered from an IET strategy that was hollow and focused at the wrong level.

The solution is simple. The Army corrects it by living up to the vision of a "Total Force", trained and ready to fight. No other Army in the world and none of the Army's sister services do this to their training units. Many in the Army say that the

training base is doing a good job, so why change anything. This completely ignores the problem. According to General Sullivan we are reshaping the Total Army-- a shift from the Army we grew up in. We are in fact reshaping only part of our Army. It is an attitudinal problem that senior Army leadership can cure through a few simple and fast actions. First, make training base assignments highly rewarding through the promotion and command selection process. This may mean floors or quotas, which is done for other situations involving discrimination. If this cannot occur then officers should not be assigned to training commands and the responsibility should be given in total to the NCO Corps. Second, adopt a new philosophy and strategy that integrates IET into the rest of the Army training doctrine. It can not be treated as separate entity as it is today. Chapter One of FM 25-100 should be IET. Third, increase the resourcing of the training base so that people, money and equipment priorities are equal to that of the TOE units. By not facing up to the dilemma we are ignoring the critical role training units play in overall combat readiness by subjugating training units to the TOE units in both resourcing and career progression.

General Sullivan's theme for the Army is " No more Task Force Smiths". The Army must understand that the training base trains the soldiers and a lot of the leaders that make up all future Task Forces. The training base is just as an important element as TOE units to ensuring there are no more Task Force Smiths.

## **ENDNOTES**

<sup>1</sup> Anne W. Chapman, "The Army's Training Revolution 1973-1990," TRADOC Historical Study Series, TRADOC, 1991, p.6-8.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., p.11-13.

<sup>3</sup> Jim Tice, "Training Command: The Kiss of Death", Army Times, 16 March 1992.

<sup>4</sup> Chapman, p.28

<sup>5</sup> Chapman, p.33-36.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid., p.44

<sup>7</sup> Charles R. Hansell, BG, USA, "Take Charge: The Initial Entry Training Strategy", Military Review, Vol. 68, No. 10, Oct 1988, p.60.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid., p.62

<sup>9</sup> Ibid., p.64

<sup>10</sup> Ibid., p.66

<sup>11</sup> Ibid., p.67

<sup>12</sup> TRADOC Message, Subject: IET Strategy Update, DTG 101900Z March 1990, DCST.

<sup>13</sup> Department of the Army, Training the Force, FM 25-100, 1988, p.2-5.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid., p.2-6.

<sup>15</sup> Hansell, p.64

<sup>16</sup> Ibid., p. 65

<sup>17</sup> TRADOC Mssg, Sub: IET Strategy.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid., p.66

<sup>19</sup> Based on authors experience as an Infantry OSUT battalion commander, 1989-1991.

## **BIBLIOGRAPHY**

- Chapman, Anne W. " The Army's Training Revolution 1973-1990". TRADOC Historical Study Series. Ft. Monroe, Va., 1991.
- Comptroller General of The United States, The Army's Test of One Station Unit Training. Washington, Comptroller General:1989.
- DA Cruz, Daniel. BOOT. St. Martins Press, New York, 1987.
- Department of The Army, IET Policies and Administration, TRADOC Regulation 350-6, Ft. Monroe: 1989.
- .Training The Force. FM 25-100, Washington GPO: 1988.
- .Battle Focused Training. FM 25-101, Washington GPO: 1990.
- General Accounting Office, The Army Needs to Reevaluate Its Extended Basic Training Program. Washington: GAO, 1982.
- \_\_\_\_\_. The Army Needs To Improve Individual Soldier Training In Its Units. Washington: GAO, 1982.
- Hansell, Charles R, BG, USA, "Take Charge: The Initial Entry Training Strategy", Military Review. Vol.68, No. 10, Oct 1990.
- Sarkesian, Sam C. Combat Effectiveness: Cohesion, Stress, and the Voluntary Military. Sage Publications, London, 1980.
- Tice, Jim. " Training Commands: The Kiss of Death," Army Times. 16 March 1992.
- TRADOC Message, Subject:IET Strategy Update. DTG 011900Z March 1990, DCST.
- Wilson, George C. Mud Soldiers. McMillian Publishing Co., New York, 1989.